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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF ST, GEORGE,

]

Plaintiff/Respondent,
1 CASE NO. 890428-CA

vs.
ELZA E. MILLER,

]

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
I.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, §78-2A-3(2)(c) (Repl. Vol. 9 1987 Ed.) and
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
II.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This appeal follows a non-jury verdict in Washington County
Fifth Circuit Court, Criminal Case No. 891000348, finding Appellant
guilty

of

disorderly

conduct

in

violation

of

U.C.A.

§76-9-102(1) (b) (i), St. George City Code as adopted, an infraction.
At the close of the State's case Appellant moved to dismiss for
failure of the State to establish a prima facie case.

That Motion

was denied.
Appellant
Information.

testified

and

denied

the

allegations

in

the

Following

the presentation of evidence

the Court

determined

that no violence had occurred on the occasion and did not find that
the

Appellant's

concluded

that

behavior

was

"tumultuous".

the evidence had established

intended to cause a public inconvenience.

However,

the

threatening

Court

behavior

The Appellant waived time

and was sentenced to pay a fine of $500.00 with $400.00 suspended
upon Appellant's successful completion of a one year probation.
III.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to

sustain a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant had
engaged in threatening behavior where the only evidence presented
concerned statements made by Appellant and those statements were,
for the most part, limited to expressions by Appellant of what ought
to or could be done as opposed to a statement of intent to engage in
specified conduct.
2.

Whether the Trial Court's refusal to allow Appellant to

introduce a cassette tape containing a recording of statements made
by one of the prosecution's witnesses, including a threat to the
Appellant after the incident in question but prior to the date of
trial,

where

prejudice,

said

and/or

tape

recording

motivation

to

was

offered

misrepresent,

to

show

bias,

constituted

error

and/or a denial of Appellant's constitutional right to due process
of law.
3.

Whether the Trial Court's refusal to allow Appellant to

present evidence of confrontations between the alleged victims and
the Appellant that had occurred on dates other than the date charged
in the information and threats made to Appellant by those witnesses
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on prior occasions; in order to demonstrate bias, prejudice, or
motivation to misrepresent and to establish Appellant's claim that
his conduct was provoked, constitutes error, a denial of Appellant's
right of confrontation, and/or a denial of due process.
4.

Whether U.C.A. §76-9-102 (1) (b) (i), insofar as it prohibits

threatening behavior, constitutes an infringement on Appellant's
Federal and State Constitutional rights to freedom of speech as
applied where the evidence presented at trial concerning "threats"
or

"threatening

behavior"

of

any

kind, was

limited

to verbal

statements by the Defendant.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution;
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah State Constitution;
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution;
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution;
U.C.A. §76-9-102(1) (b) (i);
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence;
Rule 608(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence;
V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a non-jury verdict finding the Appellant
guilty of disorderly conduct, an infraction.

The facts relevant to

the issues presented for review are:
On or about the 19th day of March, 1989, (Transcript of Trial
at 6, 20, and 28) or, according to Appellant, on March 5, 1989
(Transcript of Trial at 42) , Appellant and four individuals, three
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of whom testified at trial, engaged in a verbal altercation.
the

course

of

that

altercation, no weapon was

ever

During

displayed

(Transcript at 31) , there was no physical fight between any of the
parties

(Transcript

at

(Transcript at 34) .

33) , and

there was

no violent

In its findings the Court

violence occurred on this occasion."

found

(Transcript at 65).

conduct
"that no

The Court

also refused to base its ruling on "tumultuous" conduct because
these

were

"differences

or

nuisances

in

level

of

sound".

(Transcript at 65).
The

prosecution's

witnesses

contradicted

themselves

reference to the length of the verbal altercation.

with

Two of the

witnesses testified that the altercation lasted approximately a half
an hour (Transcript of Trial at 10 and 30), while the other witness
testified that the incident lasted approximately five to ten minutes
(Transcript

of

Trial

at

23).

In

addition,

the

prosecution's

witnesses were not consistent when testifying with regard to the
events that led up to the verbal altercation.

One of the witnesses

testified that the altercation started when one Bobby Randall, an
individual who was

not called

by

the

prosecution

to

testify,

approached a fence adjacent to the Appellant's property and the
Appellant stated that if Mr. Randall came any closer that he would
"blow his brains out."

(Transcript of Trial at_ 9) .

However, the

other two witnesses did not mention any altercation with Bobby
Randall.

One of them testified that the incident started while Mr.

Miller was attempting to tape record what the witnesses were saying
at the time while Appellant stood on his own property (Transcript of
Trial at 22) .

The other witness testified that there was no tape
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recording

but

that

the

altercation

started

when

the Appellant

started verbally accosting him and his companions while they were
playing horse shoes.

(Transcript of Trial at 29 and 32). Neither

of the last two witnesses to testify mentioned any confrontation
with Bobby Randall.
Although Appellant denied having made any threatening comments
to any of the addressees, (Transcript of Trial at 44 and 45) the
witnesses stated that Appellant made various comments about a gun,
including requesting that his wife go and "get the gun" (Transcript
at 9 and 10) , or that he had a gun (Transcript of Trial at 22 and
24).

However, no weapon was displayed (Transcript of Trial at 11,

12, 24 and 31).
Appellant was alleged to have said that he "ought to do away
with" the addressees (Transcript of Trial at 29), that he "ought to
blow [the addressees1] off" (Transcript of Trial at 22), and that he
"ought to blow [the addressees1] heads off" (Transcript of Trial at
10) .

Testimony was also presented that the Appellant had stated

that he "could" cause the addressees injury (Transcript of Trial at
24) and that he "wanted to" injure them (Transcript of Trial at 30)
but no testimony was presented that the Appellant stated that he
intended to or would cause any injury to any of the addressees who
testified at trial.

One of the witnesses testified that Appellant

had stated to Bobby Randall that "if he came one step closer, he was
going to blow his brains out," (Transcript of Trial at 9) but none
of

the

other

witnesses

mentioned

that

incident.

One

of

the

addressees testified that Mr. Miller had said that he "was going to"
injure

them

"with

a

gun"

and,

-5-

"had

a

shotgun"

but

on

cross-examination that witness admitted that the actual statement
was "I ought to blow you all away and do away with you", (Transcript
of Trial at 31).
Each of the prosecution's witnesses testified at trial that
Appellant's statements annoyed them (Transcript of Trial at 11, 23,
and 30) .

When asked whether the statements by Appellant alarmed

him, the first of the prosecution's witnesses did not answer the
question

(Transcript

of

Trial

at

11) ,

the

second

of

the

prosecution's witnesses did not answer the question (Transcript of
trial at 23), and the third of the prosecution's witnesses stated
that he was alarmed (Transcript of Trial at 31).
Although the principal witness at trial denied any animosity
toward

Appellant

(Transcript

of Trial

at

15) , the prosecution

stipulated that there existed animosity on behalf of its witnesses
toward the Appellant (Transcript of Trial at 50).
Before trial Appellant raised two objections to the proceedings
based on constitutional issues (Transcript of Trial at 3 and 4) .
Appellant

objected

unconstitutionally

on
vague

the
and

basis
that

the

that

the

statute

statute

was

constituted

an

impermissible infringement on his constitutional right to freedom of
speech.

The Court refused to consider either objection, ruling that

the objections were untimely (Transcript of Trial at 4).
At trial Appellant attempted to introduce evidence concerning a
history of prior provoking conduct by the prosecution's witnesses,
including

evidence

regarding

threats to Appellant, in order to

impeach the prosecution's witnesses and present Appellant's defense
that his conduct was justified by provocation on the part of the
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prosecution's witnesses.

The Court denied Appellant the opportunity

to do so "in the interest of time" and because the Court determined
that impeachment of that nature would be "collateral" (Transcript of
Trial

at

presented
parties

14 and

15) , even though the prosecution

evidence
(Transcript

concerning
of

Trial

prior
at

had already

confrontations

between

12) , and because

the

evidence of

provocation should be limited to the specific occasion at issue
(Transcript of Trial at 40) . (It is interesting to note that the
Court

acknowledged

being

aware

of

prior

Appellant (Transcript of Trial at 65)

incidents

involving

refused to allow Appellant

an opportunity to present evidence as to any of those matters).
Court

also

refused

to

allow

Appellant

concerning a threatening statement made

* . present

The

testimony

one of the witnesses to

Appellant between the date of the incident for which Appellant was
on trial and the date of trial or a tape recording containing that
statement, again ruling that specifics regarding that confrontation
would constitute "collateral impeachment" since animosity had been
conceded (Transcript

al at 51).

Following the presentation of evidence it 1 arguments of counsel
the Court concluded
conduct.

that Appellant had

not engaged

in violent

The Court did not find that Appellant had engaged in

tumultuous conduct. However, the Court found that the Appellant was
guilty of threatening behavior with the intent

cause public

inconvenience (Transcript of Trial at 65).
This appeal followed.
VI.
The Appellant

i-

this

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
case was convicted of the crime of

disorderly conduct based on a finding by
-7-

- Court that he had

engaged in threatening behavior.

However, the evidence presented at

trial does not sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
of that crime.

Threatening behavior, an essential element of the

crime, refers to conduct, not speech, and there was no evidence that
Appellant

engaged

in

any

"threatening

behavior".

If,

however,

Appellantfs speech were considered "behavior", the statements by the
Appellant concerning what he ought to or could do were not threats.
A threat

is a statement of

intent.

There was no expression of

intent in this instance on which the Court could base a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Utah

Rule of Evidence

608 (c) provides that evidence may be

introduced to show bias, prejudice, or motive to misrepresent.

In

this case, however, the Court refused to allow Appellant to present
testimony concerning bias, prejudice, and motive to misrepresent on
the part of the prosecution's witnesses.
introduce

evidence

concerning

prior

Appellant attempted

confrontations

between

to

these

parties, threats made by the prosecutor's witness against Appellant
prior

to

this

incident

and

a

threat

made

witness to Appellant just prior to trial.

by

the

prosecution's

All of that evidence was

excluded by the Court on the Court's determination that the esvidence
involved collateral impeachment.

While it may be that the evidence

would not be admissible solely for the purpose of impeaching the
witnesses

if

the

testimony

related

to

a collateral

mattssr, the

evidence should have been admitted for the purpose of demonstrating
bias, prejudice, or motive to misrepresent

in that the

evidence

clearly went to the issue of animosity between the parties and the
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prosecution's witnesses desire t.u inflict adverse consequences on
Appellant.
Appellant, as the Defendant in a criminal case, is entitled to
present a defense.

The defense in this instance was provocation

based on a series of altercations between the Appellant and the
prosecution1s witnesses over a period of time. The Trial Court's
refusal to allow Appellant to present evidence concerning prior
confrontations
Appellant

between

the

Appellant

an opportun *

and

the

witnesses

denied

present that defense and therefore

denied Appellant due process

-f law

: i^ranteed hy the United

States and the Utah State Constitutions.
While it may be appropriate for the government to limit speech
under

certain

circumstances,

the

Court1:,

i uling

thi\;

in

case

amounted to an unconstitutional denial of the Appellant's right to
freedom of speech.
statements

made

legitimate

governmental

uncorroborated

by

There v
Appellant

finding by the Court that the
were

concerns,

in
Willi

any
the

statement, appellant-! •,• alleged

wa:

-. r nbited

exception

of

by
one

statements did not

include an expression of any intent to cause harm but instead
expressed an opinion as to what ought or could be done,

A person's

expression of what ought « t Mould be done is precisely the type of
speech entitled to protection, even if that expression of opinion
annoys the listener.
VII. ARGUMENT
A.

THE

COURT'S

FINDING

THAT

THE

DEFENDANT

ENGAGED

THREATENING BEHAVIOR IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.
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IN

nature,

1.

Statements

are

not

by

Appellant,

"Threatening

even

Behavior"

if

as

of

a

threatening

prohibited

by

UCA

§76-9-102(1)(b)(i).
Although one of the prosecution's witnesses, Mr. Pendleton,
testified that "threats" were made (Transcript of Hearing at 10,11,
and 12) , the testimony was clear that no weapon was ever displayed
(Transcript

of Trial at

11, 12, 24, and

31), and

there was no

evidence presented at trial that Appellant did anything that could
even arguably be construed threatening except to speak.
Threatening "behavior" is something far difference than speech.
In State v. Cantwell, 676 P.2d. 353 (Or. App. 1984) the Oregon State
Court of Appeals was asked to decide that Oregon Revised Statute
166.025 (1) (a)

constituted

an

unconstitutional

infringement

on

freedom of speech because it made it a crime to engage in "fighting
or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior" with the intent
to

cause

or

recklessly

annoyance

or

alarm.

create

a

risk

In response

of, public

inconvenience,

to that argument the Court of

Appeals from the State of Oregon stated:
We do not read the statute to encompass speech in the term
"behavior" but construe it to refer only to physical acts
of violence. ..."[Flighting "and" violent, tumultuous or
threatening
behavior"
describe
physical
acts
of
aggression, not speech, and in prohibiting such physical
acts ORS 166.025 (1) (a) does not run afoul of Article I,
Section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. 676 P.2d. at 356.
The

rational

distinguishing
case.

of

behavior

the

Oregon

from

State

Court

speech, should

be

of

Appeals,

applied

in

to this

This is especially so in light of the fact that there are

other statutes that prohibit engaging in abusive language or making
unreasonable

noises.

UCA

§76-9-102 (1) (b) (iv)
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contains

elements

different

from

those

specified

in

the

Information

against

Appellant, prohibiting abusive language in a public place i ntended
to cause public annoyance or alarm and UCA §76-9-102 (1) (b) (iii)
declares it unlawful to make unreasonable noises in a private place
which can be heard in a public place intended to cause public
annoyance or alarm.

It is apparent that the legislature intended

to draw a distinction between behavior and th^ use of language.

In

this

to

instance,

since

the

only

evidence

presented

related

language, It was reversible error for the Trial Court to find that
Appellant engaged in threatening "behavior".
2.
Been

Since the Statements Made by Appellant Alleged to Have

Threatening

Were

Expressions

of

Opinion

as

Opposed

to

Expressions of Intent, They Cannot Form the Basis for a Conviction
of Engaging in "Threatening" Behavior.
In Harline vs. Campbell, 728 P.2d. 980 (Utah 1986) the Court
reaffirmed the rule that the factual findings-.

t tin; Trial Court

will not be disturbed unless there is no substantial record in the
evidence to support them.

case, the Court indicated that,

in order to obtain review of a factual finding of the Trial Court,
the Appellant must marshall all evidence in support of the Trial
Court's finding and \.\\<*w demonstrate that even when viewed in the
light most favorable to the factual determination made

- .-; Trial

Court, the evidence is insufficient to support its findings.

Even

with that standard of revi ew, the Trial Court's determination that
the Appellant engaged in "threatening" behavior is error and must
be reversed.
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The

nature

of

Appellant's

statements,

according

to

the

testimony at trial, fell into the following categories:
1.

Statements that the Appellant "oughu to" do something to

harm the alleged victims (Transcript of Trial at 10,22, and 29);
2.

Statements that the Appellant "could" cause the alleged

victims harm (Transcript of Trial at 24);
3.

Statements that the Appellant "wanted to" injure the alleged

victims (Transcript of Trial at 30) ;
4.

Statements

that

the

alleged

victims

ought

to

hurt

themselves (Transcript of Trial at 17);
5.

One statement, unsupported by the testimony of any other

witness, that the Appellant had said that if Bobby Randall came any
closer

the

Appellant

was

going

to

cause

him

physical

injury

(Transcript of Trial at 9 ) ;
6.
alleged

A statement that the Appellant was "going to" cause the
victims

harm.

statement was clarified.
statement was

that

However,

on

cross-examination,

The witness testified

the Appellant

"ought

this

that the actual

to" cause

them

injury

(Transcript of Trial at 31).
The testimony presented at trial simply does not support a
finding by the Court that the Appellant engaged in "threatening"
behavior.

A threat is defined "as an expression of an intention to

hurt, destroy, punish etc".
College Edition
and

Western

statements

(C. 1980 by Simon and Schuster, Division of Gulf

Corporation)
were

Webster's New World Dictionary, 2d

at

characterized

Page

1482.

as

threats

Although
by

the

Appellant's
prosecuting

attorney and by certain of the prosecution's witnesses, the only
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statement

that

could

statement

testified

arguably
to

by

be

Mr.

construed

Pendleton

to

be, a

that

threat

the

was

Appellant

had

s t a t e d t h a t if o n e B o b b y R a n d a l l came c l o s e r t h e n t h e A p p e l l a n t
"going

to

blow

his

brains

out".

w i t n e s s e s , allegedly p r e s e n t d u r i n g

However,

none

of

the

uhe e n t i r e i n c i d e n t

Pendleton's

concerning
any

testimony

a threatening

corroboration

there during
not

rise

made

the

provide

a

statement, that

(Transcript

"scintilla"

other

I line I. In-- u i d d e n i

level

of

proof

of

While

evidence

statement, unsupported

prosecution1s

the

the entire

to

especially

from

may

witnesses

who

beyond

a

reasonable

of

Trial

at

>H

and

-I'))

.Hid

hi .

by

were

.illegedly o c c u r r e d ,

does

doubt,

in light o f the A p p e l l a n t ' s d e n i a l t h a t any t h r e a t s

(Transcript

was

other

o f T r i a l a t 26 and 2 9 - 3 6 ) , t e s t i f i e d to a s i m i l a r s t a t e m e n t ,
Mr.

a

were

Pendleton's

conceded, although denied, animosity toward Appellant.
B.

APPELLANT WAS

ENTITLED

TO P R E S E N T E V I D E N C E C O N C E R N I N G

W I T N E S S E S ' B I A S , P R E J U D I C E , OR M O T I M
COURT

ERRED

D O SO.

WHEN

IT R E F U S E D

••

other

in p o s s e s s i o n

recorded

old mar
that

TO ALLOW APPELLANT

THE

TRIAL

OPPORTUNITY

TO

• -.. •

Appellant was
witness was

I S-<E; RESENT AND T H E

THE

as h a v i n g

referring

tape.

Appellant

threats

confrontations
evidence were

by

a tape

said:

the

to

intiwduce

parties.

to

mi wlin h

hang

and a t t e m p t e d

prosecution's
the

recording

"I'm going

to the A p p e l l a n t
attempted

between

of

to

evidence

witnesses
Those

your

concerning

to

denied,

kule on.'Ur),

Nt.ah Rules of E v i d e n c e p r o v i d e s :

EVIDENCE

BIAS.

OF

Bias,

prejudice
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or

any

ass,

introduce

and

offers

the

.-..-t, ->

earlier
present

misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either
by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise
adduced.
As stated in State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d. 200 (Utah 1987):
Evidence of bias or motive is not introduced for the
purpose of attacking or supporting a witnesses general
credibility, though it may have that effect.
Rather,
evidence of bias or motive is "always relevant as
discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his
testimony".
(Citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 US 308, 316
(1974)).
The

Court in State v. Hackford went on to state that:

"If a prior instance of conduct is relevant to a
witness's bias or motive to testify differently than would
otherwise be the case, evidence pertaining to that conduct
is not subject to exclusion under Rule 608 (b), Utah Rules
of Evidence". 737 P. 2d. at 203.
The Trial Court erred in not allowing Appellant to introduce
evidence to show the adverse witnesses' bias, prejudice, or motive
to misrepresent even though the Trial Court found that there was
animosity.
deprive

The

Trial

Appellant

Court's

the

finding

opportunity

to

of

animosity

show

the

should

extent

of

not
that

animosity.
The Trial Court found that there was animosity, but not enough
to

make

a

difference,

based

apparently

on

knowledge

acquired

elsewhere and on the concessions of the prosecutor, but determined
that there was not an adequate basis to show that the prosecution's
three

witnesses

had

fabricated

(Transcript

of

Trial

at

65).

Unfortunately, it was the ruling of that Court on evidentary issues
that precluded Appellant from presenting the very proof the Court
found lacking.
The Trial Court's refusal to allow Appellant to impeach the
prosecution's

witness

and

to

present

-14-

evidence

concerning

bias,

prejudice,

or motive

to misrepresent

and then

the Trial

Court's

specific finding that there was no adequate basis to show that the
prosecution's witnesses' testimony had been fabricated amounts to a
denial of Appellant's right to due process of law as guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution.
In addition/ where Defendant in a criminal case has been denied
an opportunity to affectively impeach the prosecution's witness by
presenting

concernir : ->ias ,

evidence

pre jud i ::e or

a

mot :i ^ re

to

misrepresent, the right to confront those witnesses is stripped of
any

real

substance.

Article

I,

Section

Constitution provides that the accused

12

of

the

Utah

State

in cruiunal prosecutions has

the right to "be confronted by the witnesses against him,.
cross examination of those witnesses is

"

If

limited as to deny the

Appellant a n < oportunity to present evide: ,• £ bias, prejudice or a
motive to misrepresent then that right to confront is no more than a
hollow ritual as opposed to a meaningful constitutional right.
Appellant' s sonstitutioi lal right tc sonfroi it the wi tnesses and
provide

sufficient

information

to the Court

to

fully assess

the

witnesses' bias and prejudice towards the Appellant were compromised
when the Trial Judge refused

allow Appellant to cross-examine the

witnesses concerning prior confrontations with Appellant and refused
to admit the witnesses' tape recorded threat to the Appellant.
C.

THE

TRIAL

COURT

ERR ED

WHEI I IT

REFUSED

TO

ALLOW

THE

APPELLANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF PROVOCATION BY THE
ALLEGED VICTIMS AS A DEFENSE TO THE CHARGE OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT.
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Under appropriate

circumstances, sufficient provocation may

justify acts or words otherwise punishable as disorderly conduct:*
12 Am, Jur. 2d, Breach of Peace, §39 at 6 91.

While the Trial Court

did not directly deny the validity of that defense, the Trial Court
did refuse to allow Appellant an opportunity to present evidence
with regard to provocation except provocation which occurred on the
date of the occurrence.
The Trial Court, obviously interested in moving this case along
as quickly as possible, refused to hear testimony with regard to any
prior confrontations between the alleged victims and Appellant. The
Trial Court apparently acknowledged that if the Appellant could
demonstrate provocation on the date of the incident in question that
that provocation could be a defense.

However, the Trial Court

limited the Appellant to the presentation of that defense in a
vacuum, without the additional information and insight which could
be obtained by considering the history of the parties1 conflict.
In this case the Appellant alleged that his comments were
provoked by comments from the addressees.

The addressees were all

friends who admittedly have animosity toward the Appellant.

In

order to assist the trier of fact in assessing credibility in a
situation of that nature, evidence of prior confrontations between
the parties, involving provocation by the alleged victims, is most
certainly relevant and should be admitted (Rule 402 Utah Rules of
Evidence) but, in addition, evidence of prior provoking conduct by
the alleged victims was most certainly

relevant to demonstrate

justification for verbal retaliation on the date in question.

-16-

It would

make

life

very

simple

could b e viewed in a vacuum.

if each

instance

IJnfortunatel\, specific instances o f

c o n d u c t a r e often t h e result o f a pattern o f b e h a v i o r .
the A p p e l l a n t
conduct
totality

by

alleged

that there

t h e alleged

of conduct

had been

victims.

o f that relationship

a history

Appellant

should

In this case
of p r o v o k i n g

maintains

be considered

that

the

in d e t e r m i n i n g

w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e instance in q u e s t i o n w a s p r o v o k e d .
Appellant's

opportunity

t o present

a meaningful

defense w a s

d e n i e d w h e n the T r i a l Court refused h i m an opportunity

t o inquire

into and present evidence concerning pr i or provocatioi
The

Trial

Appellant's
guaranteed

Court's

defense

error

denied

in

limiting

Appellant

due

try tl le U1 : a 1 1 and I: .he I Jn i ted

the presentation
process
States

of

of

law as

Constitutions

(Utah

S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n , A r t i c l e I, Section 7 , and F i f t h A m e n d m e n t to t h e
U n i t e d States C o n s t i t u t i o n ) .
D.
OF

T H E TRIAL COURT'S RULING IN THIS CASE AMOUNTS TO A DENIAL

THE APPELLANT'S

RIGHTS

TO FREEDOM

OF SPEECH

A S GUARANTEED

BY

A R T I C L E I, SECTION 15 OF T H E U T A H STATE CONSTITUTION A N D T H E F I R S T
A M E N D M E N T T O T H E UNITED STATES C O N S T I T U T I O N .
A r t i c l e I, Section

15 o f t h e Utah State C o n s t i t u t i o n

provides

as follows:
N o l a w shall be passed to abridge or restrain
speech...

the freedom o f

.-. -a ,-..; -.: -t.-j ; *

The First Amende .

.

;. ^ides

as follows:
Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech...
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The United States Supreme Court has allowed the prevention and
the punishment of speech only if the speech falls in one of three
categories:
1.

If the speech presents a "clear and present danger" of

imminent violence or breach of peace, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 US
1, 4, 69 S. Ct. 894, 895, 93 L. Ed., 1131 (1948);
2.

When the speech consists of "fighting words" Chaplinsky v.

New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942);
3.

When the speech advocates criminal activity, Brandenburg v.

Ohio, 395 US 444, 89 S. Ct., 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969).
In this case there was no evidence presented that Appellant's
statements presented a clear and present danger of imminent violence
or a breach of the peace.

There was no testimony that Appellant

made any aggressive movement toward any of the alleged victims.
testimony

indicated

that

no weapon was

displayed

(Transcript

The
of

Trial at 11, 12, 24 and 31). Although each of the alleged victims
testified that he was annoyed by what the Appellant said (Transcript
of

Trial

at

11, 23 and

30)

none

of

them

testified

as

to

any

circumstances which would give rise to a finding that there was a
clear and present danger of imminent violence or a breach of the
peace.

As the Supreme Court stated in Terminiello v. Chicago:

"•..[F]reedom af speech, though not absolute, [citing
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, Supra] is nevertheless
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive
evil
that
rises
far
above
public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." 337 US at 4.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court
stated:
Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within
the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only
-18-

when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to
excite the addressee to a breach of the peace..." 315 U.S.
at 573.
In this instance there was no testimony at trial suggesting that
the statements alleged to be made by Appellant were "plainly tending
to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace."

Quite to the

contrary, although the addressees were annoyed, Mr. Pendleton's self
serving testimony at trial was that, in response to Mr. Miller's
statements,

they

"talked

back

to

him.. .saying,

'calm

down

Mr.

Miller,'...we weren't making no threats, or anything back towards
him."

(Transcript of Trial at 11).
In Brandenburg vs. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court stated

that: "
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and
free press do not permit a state to prohibit or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
eminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action." 395 US at 447.
In this instance the Appellant's alleged statements as to the
appropriateness of "blowing" the addressees away or his statement of
opinion as to his own ability to do so were not of such a nature as
to advocate criminal conduct likely to incite or produce such action.

In this case nearly all of the statements the Appellant is
alleged to have made were expressions of opinion.
consisted of what ought to or could be done.

His statements

Statements of what

ought to or could be done fall within the category of statements
entitled to protection under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

In finding the Appellant guilty of disorderly conduct

-19-

by expressing those opinions, the Trial Court's ruling amounts to a
denial of this Appellant's right to freely express his opinion, a
ienial of his freedom of speech as guaranteed by the United States
and the Utah State Constitutions*
VIII,

CONCLUSION

The Appellant in this case did not engage in any threatening
behavior.

He made statements*

With the exception of the allegation

Df one witness, uncorroborated by any others, none of the statements
could even arguably be considered
expressions

of

opinion,

not

threats.

expressions

The statements were

of

intent.

They

are

accordingly protected as free speech under the United States and
Utah

State

Constitutions

and

are

not

statements

for which the

Appellant can be found guilty of committing a crime.
The Trial Court erred when it refused Appellant the opportunity
to present

testimony

prejudice,

or

and evidence

motive

to

in

an

misrepresent

effort
on

the

to

show bias,

part

of

the

prosecution's witnesses and when it refused to allow the Appellant an
opportunity

to

present

the

theory

of

this

case,

that

is,

justification based on provocation.
Finally,

Appellant

cannot

be

found

guilty

of

threatening

"behavior" when all he did was speak.
By reason of the Trial Court's errors, Appellant respectfully
submits that the decision of the Trial Court, finding Appellant
guilty of the crime of disorderly conduct, should be reversed and
remanded with instructions to discharge Appellant
Sorenson, 758 P.2d. 466

(see State vs.

(Ut. App. 1988), or, at the very least,

Appellant should be granted a new trial consistent with due process

-20-

and be permitted an opportunity to present the theory of his case and
to

present

evidence

regarding

bias,

prejudice,

or

motive

to

misrepresent on the part of the prosecution's witnesses.
BATED this

day of September, 1989.
GALLIAN & WESTFALL

By; /
G. Michael Weatfall
/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed 4 true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing document, postage pre-paid on this
day of
September, 1989, to the following:
Theodore W. Shumway
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770

Secretary
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Annotated §76-9-102. Disorderly Conduct.
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(a)
He refuses to comply with the lawful order of the
police to move from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous
or physically offensive condition, by any act which serves no
legitimate purpose; or
(b)
Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance,
or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof;
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous
or, threatening behavior; or.
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public place;
or
(iii)
He makes unreasonable noises in a private
place which can be heard in a public place; or
(iv)
He enages in abusive or obscene language or
makes obscene jestures in a public place; or
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
(2)
"Public place, " for the purpose of this section, means
any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public
has access and includes but is not limited to streets, highways, and
the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office
buildings, transport facilities, and shops.
(3) Disorderly conduct is a Class C Misdemeanor if the offense
continues after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an
infraction.

First Amendment to the United States Constitution:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press; or of the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for redress of
grievances.
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
No person shall...be deprived
without due process of law.

of

life,

liberty,

or

property

Article I, Section 7, Utah State Constitution.
No person shall be deprive
without due process of law.

of

life,

liberty,

or

property,

Article I, Section 12, Utah State Constitution.
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
to...be confronted by the witnesses against him....

have

the

right

Article I, Section 15, Utah State Constitution,
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 40 2:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules or by
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 608(c):
Bias, prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to
impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by
evidence otherwise adduced.

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, ST. GEORGE DEPT.
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
plaintiff,
vs.
ELZA E. MILLER
1925 West 1700 North
St. George, Utah

Bail $
AMENDED INFORMATION

Criminal Mo.

391000348

Defendant(s)
The undersigned complainant under o a t h , scares on
information and belief that che defendant committed the crime(s)
of:
Defendant, Sl^a E. Miller, did engage in violent, tumultuous or
threatening behavior intended to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance or recklessly creating a risk thereof, in violation of
Sec. 76-9-102(b) (i) , St. George City Code as adopted. This is an
infraction .
DATE: March 5, 1989 or March 19, 1989
PLACE: 1926 West 1700 North, St. George, Utah
This information is based on evidence from these witnesses:
John B. Hopkins, Don Pendleton, Donny Ward, Bobby Randall, Robert
Pendleton, Rudy Torres, Randy Benson

Complainant
Filin

Subscribed and sworn to before me
Date :

Circuit Judge
T. W. Shumway

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
ELZA E MILLER
1926 West 1700 North
St. George, Utah 84770

Case No. 891000343

Defendant.

The above matter having come on for trial before the Court
on Defendant Elza E Miller's plea of not guilty to charges of
violating Sec. 76-9-102 (b) (i) , St. George City Code as adopted,
the Defendant being present and represented by counsel, and the
Court having heard the evidence presented by the parties,
Good cause appearing, Defendant Elza E Miller is found and
adjudged to be guilty of the charge against him.

The Defendant

waived his right for a sentencing delay, and a fine of $500 is
imposed, $100 of the same to be paid within 30 days of the date
of the trial.
period

of

restraining

one

The remaining $400 of the same is suspended for a
year

order

on

conditions

that

Defendant

obey

a

issued by the Court not to display or make

reference to his guns and that Defendant is not to talk with the

neighbors that are involved in this case.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this 25tn day of May, 1989

Rooert. F. Owens
Circuit Court Judge

Judgment, Elza E Miller - Page 2

